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Precedent, Principle and
Pragmatism: Justice Wilson and the
Expansion of Canadian Tort Law
Kate Sutherland*

I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law does not appear to have been a particular area of interest for
Bertha Wilson during her years as a law student or in legal practice. But
after she was appointed to the bench, some of her best-known judgments
both at the Ontario Court of Appeal and at the Supreme Court of Canada
were tort decisions (for example, Bhadauria v. Seneca College of
Applied Arts and Technology1 and Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen),2 and
they, along with a number of other decisions authored by her, remain
staples of the tort law curriculum. Clearly Justice Wilson made an
impact on Canadian tort law.
This article focuses squarely on her tort decisions, analyzing them as
a body with a view to determining whether a coherent tort theory or
philosophy underpins them. At first glance, a thread to connect this body
of decisions is elusive; indeed, on the surface, a number of them appear
to contradict one another. For example, based on her Bhadauria
judgment in which she boldly created a new tort of discrimination, we
might regard Justice Wilson as a tort expansionist. Yet elsewhere, we see
her protecting other areas of law from incursion by tort (contract law in
Dominion Chain v. Eastern Construction Co.3 and family law in Frame
v. Smith).4 And in other decisions, she positions herself somewhere
between these poles, championing an incremental expansion of tort law

*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
[1979] O.J. No. 4475, 27 O.R. (2d) 142, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707 (Ont. C.A.), revd [1981]
S.C.J. No. 76, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bhadauria”].
2
[1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kamloops”].
3
[1976] O.J. No. 2104, 12 O.R. (2d) 201, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1978]
S.C.J. No. 61, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1346 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dominion Chain”].
4
[1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Frame”].
1
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where precedent allows and justice demands (for example, in Kamloops
and in Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd.).5
But digging deeper into Justice Wilson’s tort decisions, common
themes emerge which link them to one another and ground them firmly
in the broader context of her judicial work as a whole. In tort, as in other
areas of law, we find Justice Wilson striving to make decisions that are
respectful of the constraints within which she operated as an appellate
judge, true to her liberal principles, and responsive to the practical
concerns of the parties appearing before her.

II. INITIAL ENCOUNTERS WITH TORT LAW
Bertha Wilson’s experience as a first-year torts student was
noteworthy for two reasons. First, it was in that class that she made the
acquaintance of Dr. William R. Lederman, who became her favourite
law school professor and an important mentor to her for many years
thereafter. Second, it was there that she learned an important lesson
about exam writing that set her on track for the excellence she ultimately
achieved as a student. In a 1993 tribute to Dr. Lederman, she explained:
I recall, as a mature first year student many years removed from the
technique of writing examinations, going to his office to ask why I had
not done better in the Christmas test in torts. He handed me my paper
and asked me to read my answer to a question involving a hockey
player hitting another player during the game with his hockey stick. He
said “You assumed that I knew that you knew that the tort involved
was the tort of assault but at no point in your paper did you say so. You
have to set your answer out step by step from the beginning and after
you have done that go on to argue the finer points.” I will always be
grateful for that first interview because it reminded me that in the
world of examinations nothing is to be taken for granted and
everything is to be documented. I had no further problems with
examinations from then on.6

Nevertheless, tort law does not seem to have become a particular
area of interest for her at that stage. It was the upper year courses in
constitutional law and jurisprudence taught by Dr. Lederman more so
than that first-year torts class that she found especially stimulating. In
her biography of Justice Wilson, Ellen Anderson describes Justice
5
6

[1988] S.C.J. No. 60, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crocker”].
Bertha Wilson, “The Ideal Teacher” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 16, at 16-17.
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Wilson’s response to her initial exposure to tort law as an ambivalent
one:
There is no question that Wilson found torts conceptually interesting,
and the method of teaching it generally appropriate. However, she
considered the case book approach to be too much of a good thing. The
torts course suffered from the excessive number of cases (some 187)
with which Dalhousie students were to be familiar for the
examination.7

During her 17 years in practice, Justice Wilson developed particular
expertise in the realm of corporate and commercial law. Doubtless she
would have encountered tort law occasionally, in the guise of one or
another of the business torts, or negligence as it intersects with contract
law. But tort law was not a primary focus for her then either.
It was only after Justice Wilson ascended to the bench that tort law
began to figure prominently in her legal work. Not that she penned a vast
number of tort decisions — in contrast to her constitutional output, for
example, her tort decisions seem a modest handful.8 But of those tort
decisions she did pen, both at the Ontario Court of Appeal and at the
Supreme Court, several were high profile decisions that proved to be of
long-standing importance.

III. EARLY JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON TORT: BHADAURIA
Bhadauria v. Seneca College,9 arguably Justice Wilson’s best-known
judgment from her tenure on the Court of Appeal, was a tort case.
Indeed, even after all of her distinguished work at the Supreme Court, I
would venture to say that Bhadauria remained one of the best-known
judgments of her judicial career. As such, it deserves sustained attention
here.
7
Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001), at 41 [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”].
8
See James MacPherson, “Canadian Constitutional Law and Madame Justice Bertha
Wilson — Patriot, Visionary and Heretic” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 217, at 222 for a statistical
picture of Justice Wilson’s constitutional activity on the Supreme Court:
During her nine years at the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court heard 217 constitutional
cases. Justice Wilson participated in 188 or 85.7 per cent of these cases. Moreover, she
wrote judgments in 69 or 36.5 per cent of the cases in which she participated. These
participation and writing rates are even higher in Charter cases. She participated in 89 per
cent of the Court’s Charter cases and wrote judgments in 43.6 per cent of the cases in which
she participated (65:149).
9
Supra, note 1.
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The plaintiff in the case was a highly educated East Indian woman.
She held a B.A., an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Mathematics as well as an
Ontario teaching certificate. She had seven years of experience teaching
mathematics. During a four-year period she made 10 applications for
teaching positions at the defendant College, each time in response to
advertisements placed in Toronto newspapers. Her applications were
acknowledged but she was never granted an interview, nor provided with
any reason for the rejection of her applications. She alleged that each
position was filled by someone who did not have her high qualifications,
but who was not of East Indian origin.
The plaintiff alleged that she had been discriminated against in
contravention of section 4 of the Ontario Human Rights Code,10 which
prohibited discrimination in employment on grounds of race, creed,
colour, sex, marital status, nationality, ancestry or place of origin. She
declined to file a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission,
instead bringing an action in tort. She claimed damages for deprivation of
teaching opportunities and of a teaching salary. Further, she claimed
damages for mental distress, frustration, loss of self-esteem and dignity
arising from the discriminatory treatment to which she had been subjected.
These claims were grounded in two separate causes of action. First,
the plaintiff argued that the respondent College had breached a common
law duty not to discriminate against her. Second, it had breached a
statutory duty not to discriminate that flowed from its breach of the
Ontario Human Rights Code. Writing for a unanimous court, Wilson J.
found for the plaintiff based on the common law cause of action.
She noted that, “[w]hile no authority . . . has recognized a tort of
discrimination, none has repudiated such a tort”,11 then quoted the
following passage from Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts:
The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development
are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are
entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the
mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the
remedy.12

She cited the preamble to the Ontario Human Rights Code as
evidence of the public policy of the province regarding human rights,

10
11
12

R.S.O. 1970, c. 318.
Bhadauria, supra, note 1, at 149 O.R. (C.A.).
Id.
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particularly equality, but not as the originator of such public policy.13
She held that the right to equality ought to receive the full protection of
the common law, and that tort recovery for discrimination provided
appropriate protection. She did not regard the Code as impeding the
development of such a remedy, but rather the reverse given that relief
under it is dependent on Ministerial discretion.14 Thus, a new common
law tort of discrimination was born.
The decision was widely lauded.15 Mr. Justice Allen Linden, a
renowned tort scholar and professor before his appointment to the bench,
indicated that he had been delighted by it and that others were “dancing
in the streets”.16 This seems no hyperbole when we consider such
contemporaneous responses as that of civil rights lawyer Joseph
Pomerant, who deemed it “the most important decision for the little guy
on the street in the history of this country”17 and academic Dale Gibson,
who pronounced it “a blessed event”.18
Alas, the reception by the Supreme Court was not so positive; a year
and a half later, Bhadauria was overturned on appeal. Chief Justice
Laskin (as he then was) expressed puzzlement at Wilson J.’s observation
that “while the fundamental human right we are concerned with is
recognized by the Code, it was not created by it”.19 He could see little
difference between the common law and statutory causes of action put
forward by the plaintiff, viewing the common law argument as an
attempt to found a new action at common law “by reference to policies
reflected in the statute and standards fixed by the statute”.20 The case, for
him, “[was] not concerned with whether a remedy can be provided for an
admitted right but whether there is a right at all, that is, an interest which

13

Id., at 149-50 O.R.
Id., at 150 O.R.
15
Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 7, at 121-24; Dale Gibson, “The New Tort of
Discrimination: A Blessed Event for the Great-Grandmother of Torts” (1980) 11 C.C.L.T. 141
[hereinafter “‘The New Tort of Discrimination’”]; Maureen E. Baird, “Pushpa Bhadauria v. The
Board of Governors of The Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology: A Case Comment”
(1981) 39 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 96; Ian A. Hunter, “The Stillborn Tort of Discrimination: Bhadauria v.
Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology” (1982) 14 Ottawa L. Rev.
222; and Harry Kopyto, “The Bhadauria Case: The Denial of the Right to Sue for Discrimination”
(1981) 7 Queen’s L.J. 162.
16
Judging Bertha Wilson, id., at 124.
17
Cited id., at 121.
18
“The New Tort of Discrimination”, supra, note 15, at 150.
19
Bhadauria, supra, note 1, at 192.
20
Id., at 188.
14
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the law will recognize as deserving protection”.21 He characterized the
tort recognized by the Court of Appeal as “a species of an economic tort,
new in its instance and founded, even if indirectly, on a statute enacted
in an area outside a fully recognized area of common law duty”.22
Chief Justice Laskin stated that “while the view taken by the Ontario
Court of Appeal [was] a bold one and may be commended as an attempt
to advance the common law”, such an attempt was “foreclosed by the
legislative initiative which overtook the existing common law in Ontario
and established a different regime”.23 He held that, in the Human Rights
Code, the legislature of Ontario had created a comprehensive scheme “in
its administrative and adjudicative features, the latter including a wide
right of appeal to the Courts on both fact and law”.24 He concluded that
“not only does the Code foreclose any civil action based directly upon a
breach thereof but it also excludes any common law action based on an
invocation of the public policy expressed in the Code”.25
Despite this prompt reversal, Justice Wilson’s Court of Appeal
decision in Bhadauria has generated continuing interest and enthusiasm
among activists and academics, some of whom have expressed hope that
the entrenchment of a constitutional right to equality in the intervening
years would dictate a different result should the Supreme Court be called
upon to consider anew the possibility of a common law tort of
discrimination.26
Justice Wilson’s decision in Bhadauria was undoubtedly an
important event in her judicial career. Ellen Anderson goes so far as to
suggest that it was one of the factors that elevated her name to the top of
the list of potential appointees to the Supreme Court in 1982. She
recounts an exchange that occurred between Allen Linden and then
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau just prior to her appointment. Trudeau,
who was seeking to identify a female candidate who would make a
credible appointment to the as yet all-male court, asked Linden for his
21

Id., at 192.
Id., at 189.
23
Id., at 195.
24
Id., at 183.
25
Id., at 195.
26
See, for example, Kate Sutherland, “The New Equality Paradigm: The Impact of Charter
Equality Rights on Private Law Decisions” in D. Schneiderman & K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the
Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Law and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1997); Jeffrey Radnoff & Pamela Foy, “The Tort of Discrimination” (2002) 26
Advoc. Q. 311; and Gillian Demeyere, “Common Law Actions for Sexual Harassment: The
Jurisdiction Question Revisited” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 637.
22
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views on Justice Wilson. Trudeau was already aware of her solid
reputation in commercial law, but looking ahead to the impending
coming into force of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,27 he
wanted to know about her record on human rights and civil liberties.
Anderson describes Linden’s response to the query and the events that
followed thus:
In Linden’s opinion, Wilson was supremely competent in commercial
law but her heart was in human rights; there could be no one finer.
Trudeau was not familiar with the Wilson judgment in Bhadauria;
when Linden described it to him, he requested that Linden forward a
copy of it to him. Within a few days, the Wilson appointment had been
announced.28

The fact that Justice Wilson’s Bhadauria decision had made an
impression on Trudeau and his government was underscored by a
playful mention of it by then Justice Minister Jean Chrétien at her
swearing-in ceremony:
Although I know that Madame Justice Wilson will work closely with
her new associates, her service on the Court of Appeal demonstrates
that she will not hesitate to write clearly and compellingly in dissent.
My Lord the Chief Justice has been recently aware of the persuasive
innovation which his new associate can bring to her judgments, and in
the future, he may find it more difficult to resist the kind of reasoning
which he recently characterized as a bold and commendable attempt to
advance the common law.29

Justice Wilson’s Bhadauria decision does seem to have augured
things to come when we think of the reputation she went on to develop
at the Supreme Court for creative judgments responsive to equality
concerns, particularly in the realm of Charter jurisprudence. But what
does Bhadauria tell us about her tort philosophy? Did it hold any
predictive power with respect to her future tort decisions?

IV. TO EXPAND OR NOT TO EXPAND TORT LAW
Based on her bold creation of a new tort of discrimination in
Bhadauria, we might be tempted to label Justice Wilson a tort
27
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
28
Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 7, at 125.
29
Cited id., at 129.
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expansionist and to anticipate that in future judgments she would create
other new torts to protect other legal interests. In fact, however,
analyzing her tort decisions as a body, the picture becomes much more
complicated. Both before and after Bhadauria,30 she was as likely to put
the brakes on tort expansion as to further it.
Early in her tenure at the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Wilson
registered dissents in a pair of cases, Dominion Chain and Dabous v.
Zuliani,31 that,
. . . raise[d] the question of whether a contractor on the one hand, and
an architect or engineer on the other hand, who have both been
negligent in the performance of their respective contracts with a
plaintiff for the construction of a building by the contractor and for the
supervision of such construction by the architect or engineer, have
rights under the Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 296, of contribution
and indemnity against one another.32

The majority held that the contractor and the architect or engineer in that
scenario owed tort duties that overlapped with the contractual
obligations that they had taken upon themselves; as a consequence they
did constitute tortfeasors within the meaning of the Negligence Act and
so had rights under it of contribution and indemnity against one another.
Justice Wilson disagreed with the majority on the issue of contract/
tort overlap, opining that “where the architect or engineer has been
negligent in the performance of his contractual obligations to the owner,
the owner’s suit should properly be brought in contract.”33 She continued:
We are not in my view concerned here with the duty of a defendant not
to injure his “neighbour” as defined by Lord Atkin in M’Alister (or
Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 at p. 580. It is true that if A
has contracted with B to perform certain acts in relation to B’s person
or property, then B may be characterized as a member of a class of
“persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called
in question”. However, where the person to whom the duty is owed,
the scope of the duty and the standard of care have all been expressly
or impliedly agreed upon by the parties, it appears to me somewhat
30

Supra, note 1.
Dominion Chain, supra, note 3 (C.A.); Dabous v. Zuliani, [1976] O.J. No. 2105, 12 O.R.
(2d) 230, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 414 (Ont. C.A.).
32
Dominion Chain, id., at 204-205 O.R.
33
Id., 223 O.R.
31
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artificial to rely upon Lord Atkin’s “neighbour” test to determine
whether or not the duty is owed to the particular plaintiff and as to the
requisite standard of care the defendant must attain. In other words, it
would appear that if the acts or omissions complained of by the
plaintiff are in relation to the very matters covered by the contract, the
essence of the plaintiff’s action is breach of the contractual duty of care
rather than breach of the general duty of care owed to one’s
“neighbour” in tort.34

She noted that the scope of the duty owed and the remedies available
for breach may be different in contract and in tort, and made clear that
she regarded it as an undesirable outcome that parties to a contract
should recoup in tort damages that they were not entitled to under that
contract: “In my view, the provisions of the contract must govern in such
circumstances. I do not believe, for example, that a plaintiff, by framing
his action in tort, can allege a higher standard of care than that agreed
upon by the parties themselves.”35
Initially I tried to make sense of the apparent disjunction between
Justice Wilson’s Bhadauria and Dominion Chain judgments by
reference to the following well-known passage from her 1990 “Will
Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” speech:
Taking from my own experience as a judge of fourteen years’ standing,
working closely with my male colleagues on the bench, there are
probably whole areas of the law on which there is no uniquely
feminine perspective. This is not to say that the development of the law
in these areas has not been influenced by the fact that lawyers and
judges have all been men. Rather, the principles and the underlying
premises are so firmly entrenched and so fundamentally sound that no
good would be achieved by attempting to re-invent the wheel, even if
the revised version did have a few more spokes in it. I have in mind
areas such as the law of contract, the law of real property, and the law
applicable to corporations. In some other areas of the law, however, a
distinctly male perspective is clearly discernible. It has resulted in legal
principles that are not fundamentally sound and that should be revisited
when the opportunity presents itself. Canadian feminist scholarship has
done an excellent job of identifying those areas and making
suggestions for reform. Some aspects of the criminal law in particular
cry out for change; they are based on presuppositions about the nature

34
35

Id., at 224 O.R.
Id.
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of women and women’s sexuality that, in this day and age, are little
short of ludicrous.36

There is no explicit mention of it here, but given the diverse terrain that
tort law encompasses, it seems bound to straddle the divide Justice
Wilson constructed between those areas of the law that ought to be left
alone and those that cry out for reform.
Thus we could imagine Justice Wilson regarding the tort/contract
overlap issue of Dominion Chain as falling within the “firmly
entrenched” and “fundamentally sound” realm of contract and requiring
no reform through tort expansion, whereas the damages suffered as a
consequence of discrimination in Bhadauria would seem an obvious site
for innovative tort remedies. But an analysis that links in straightforward
fashion Justice Wilson’s openness to tort expansion with areas of the law
that she identified as ripe for feminine/feminist reform does not hold up
when we factor in more of her Supreme Court tort decisions. For
example, in Frame v. Smith,37 she declined to expand tort remedies in the
family law context, an area that would certainly fall on the “ripe for
reform” side of her ledger.
In Frame, the plaintiff brought an action against his ex-wife and her
new husband, alleging that they had done everything that they could to
frustrate his court-ordered access to his three children, ultimately
destroying his relationship with them. He claimed that the defendants’
conduct had put him to considerable expense and also caused him
extreme mental distress. He sought damages from them for their
interference with his legal relationship with his children. The
defendants’ application to strike succeeded at trial and was, in turn,
upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada.
Justice Wilson dissented in the result, but agreed with the majority
that there should be no recovery in tort for this plaintiff. She noted that
the facts of the case could fit within the existing tort of conspiracy and
that precedent did not preclude the extension of the tort into the family
law context. But, she asserted, the real question is not whether the tort
could be extended to cover this scenario, but whether it should be
extended. Despite her sympathy for the plaintiff, she concluded that it
should not:

36
Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 507.
37
Frame, supra, note 4.

(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) PRECEDENT, PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM

141

It would be my view that the tort of conspiracy should not be extended
to the family law context. Although “the law concerning the scope of
the tort of conspiracy is far from clear” the criticisms which have been
levelled at the tort give good reason to pause before extending it
beyond the commercial context”.38

Further: “Having regard to the overriding concern for the best interests
of the children, I am not persuaded that the tort of conspiracy should be
extended to encompass the claim of the plaintiff.”39
For similar reasons, Wilson J. was no more inclined to extend the
tort of intentional infliction of mental distress to cover the plaintiff’s
claim:
Finally, and most importantly, the extension of this cause of action to
the custody and access context would not appear to be in the best
interests of children. Like the tort of conspiracy the tort of intentional
infliction of mental suffering would be relatively ineffective in
encouraging conduct conducive to the maintenance and development
of a relationship between both parents and their children. It is obvious
also that such a cause of action, if it were made available throughout
the family law context, would have the same potential for petty and
spiteful litigation and, perhaps worse, for extortionate and vindictive
behaviour as the tort of conspiracy. Indeed, the tort of intentional
infliction of mental suffering appears to be an ideal weapon for spouses
who are undergoing a great deal of emotional trauma which they
believe is maliciously caused by the other spouse. It is not for this
Court to fashion an ideal weapon for spouses whose initial, although
hopefully short-lived objective, is to injure one another, especially
when this will almost inevitably have a detrimental effect on the
children. Yet, if this cause of action were extended to encompass the
facts of this case, it seems to me that there is no rational basis upon
which its extension to other areas of family law could be resisted. The
gist of the tort is the intentional infliction of mental suffering
regardless of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. It would
be available in respect of all inter-spousal conduct both before and
after marital breakdown. I would therefore not extend this common law
tort to the family law context where the spin-off effects on the children
could only be harmful.40

38
39
40

Id., at 124.
Id., at 126-27.
Id., at 128-29.
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Finally, Wilson J. indicated that a new tort to remedy violation of
parental access rights was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bhadauria. Given the foregoing, however, I think it is safe to say that
she would not have been inclined to create such a tort even if she
believed that precedent left room to do so. It is not that she was reluctant
to extend tort liability when she thought it appropriate, but rather that she
did not think it appropriate in this context. Although she had sympathy
for the plaintiff and judged him to have suffered a compensable loss, she
was not convinced that the individualized relief provided by tort law was
the right way to address that loss.
Instead, she looked to the cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty for a remedy, and here parted way with the majority of the Court,
who denied the plaintiff’s appeal altogether. She opted for fiduciary duty
over tort because, in her view, to do so would afford the Court the
flexibility to give the best interests of the child paramount importance:
Finally, unlike the causes of action in tort, the cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty allows the court to take into account conduct
of a non-custodial parent (whether related to custody and access issues
or not) which might be contrary to the best interests of children. When
considering breaches of equitable duty and awarding equitable
remedies the court has a wide scope for the exercise of discretion
which does not exist in respect of common law causes of action. In the
context of breach of fiduciary duty this discretion would allow the
court to deny relief to an aggrieved party or grant relief on certain
terms if that party’s conduct has disabled him or her from full relief,
e.g., non-payment of spousal support or previous abuse of access
rights. There is neither precedent nor historical basis for the exercise of
such a discretion in the case of a common law tort action. The tort
would be actionable regardless of the inequitable conduct of the
plaintiff.41

The extension of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty that
Wilson J. proposed in her Frame dissent would have been an innovative
move,42 so her reluctance to expand the reach of tort law in the case
41

Id., at 144.
On this point, see Mary Jane Mossman, “The ‘Family’ in the Work of Madame Justice
Wilson” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 115, at 146, n. 88:
It should also be noted that Justice Wilson’s conclusion that a custodial parent has a
fiduciary obligation in relation to the non-custodial parent and the children is remarkable for
its destruction of the public/private division in law. None of the literature cited in her
judgment applied the fiduciary concept to family relationships; this analysis was her work
alone.
42
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cannot be regarded as a cautious turn prompted by the Supreme Court
reception of her Court of Appeal decision in Bhadauria. Nor can it be
seen simply as a reflection of her doubts about the tort of conspiracy. For
a few years later, in Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.,43 we find her expressing
an openness to the extension of that tort in a different factual context.
The plaintiff in Hunt brought an action against the defendants after
developing mesothelioma. He alleged that this medical condition was the
result of his exposure to asbestos fibres in the course of his employment,
and that the defendants, all companies involved in the mining,
production and supply of asbestos and asbestos products, had known of
the dangers of such exposure at the time and that they had withheld
information about those dangers. His action was founded exclusively in
the tort of conspiracy and the defendants moved to have the action struck
for want of a reasonable claim. The defendants were successful in having
the action struck out at trial, but the Court of Appeal overturned that
decision and the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal.
In their arguments, the defendants placed considerable weight on the
portion of Wilson J.’s judgment in Frame in which she expressed doubts
about expanding the tort of conspiracy and declined to do so in the
family law context.44 But Wilson J., writing for a unanimous Court this
time around, was not willing to concede that it would be equally
inappropriate to extend the tort of conspiracy to cover the facts of Hunt,
at least not in the context of an application to strike a statement of claim:
Is it plain and obvious that allowing this action to proceed amounts to
an abuse of process? I do not think so. While there has clearly been
judicial reluctance to extend the scope of the tort beyond the
commercial context, I do not think this Court has ever suggested that
the tort could not have application in other contexts. … While courts
should pause before extending the tort beyond its existing confines,
careful consideration might conceivably lead to the conclusion that the
tort has a useful role to play in new contexts.
I note that in Frame v. Smith, supra, at p. 125, I was not prepared to
extend the tort of conspiracy to the custody and access context both
because such an extension was not in the best interests of children and
because such an extension would not have been consistent with the
rationale that underlies the tort of conspiracy: “namely that the tort be

43

[1990] S.C.J. No. 93, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunt”].
Remember that though hers was a dissenting judgment the majority agreed with her on
this point. Frame, [1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, at 109 (S.C.C.).
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available where the fact of combination creates an evil which does not
exist in the absence of combination”. But in the appeal now before us it
seems to me much less obvious that a similar conclusion would
necessarily be reached. If the facts as alleged by the plaintiff are true,
and for the purposes of this appeal we must assume that they are, then
it may well be that an agreement between corporations to withhold
information about a toxic product might give rise to harm of a
magnitude that could not have arisen from the decision of just one
company to withhold such information. There may, accordingly, be
good reason to extend the tort to this context.45

She concluded therefore that it was not “plain and obvious” that the
plaintiff had no chance of success and so his action should be allowed to
proceed to trial.
Thus in the quartet of Wilson J.’s tort decisions that we have
considered so far, we see a bold expansion of tort law in Bhadauria,46
and an openness to future expansion in Hunt,47 contrasted with the
expression of firm convictions in her dissents in Dominion Chain48 and
Frame49 that the incursion of negligence into contract law and of the tort
of conspiracy into family law respectively should be stopped cold. More
often though, what we see in her Supreme Court judgments is an
incremental expansion of tort law, such as in Kamloops,50 Crocker51 and
Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co.52
Justice Wilson’s majority judgment in Kamloops is best known by
contemporary torts students as an authoritative pronouncement that the
House of Lord’s two-stage Anns test for determining the existence of a
duty of care in negligence was duly adopted into Canadian law. But at
the time it was handed down, it was hailed for important developments
in three areas of negligence law: (1) liability of public authorities; (2)
liability for pure economic loss; and (3) the time at which the statutory

45

Hunt, supra, note 43, at 988-89.
[1979] O.J. No. 4475, 27 O.R. (2d) 142, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707 (Ont. C.A.), revd [1981]
S.C.J. No. 76, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.).
47
Supra, note 43.
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[1970] O.J. No. 2104, 12 O.R. (3d) 201, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1978]
S.C.J. No. 61, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1346 (S.C.C.).
49
[1987] S.C.J. No. 49, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.).
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[1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).
51
[1988] S.C.J. No. 60, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 (S.C.C.).
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 121, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fletcher”].
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limitation period begins to run in cases in which damage is caused by
latent defects.53
The issue in Kamloops was “whether a municipality can be held
liable for negligence in failing to prevent the construction of a house
with defective foundations”.54 Justice Wilson, writing for a majority of
the Court, concluded that it could:
. . . [T]he evidence gives rise to a strong inference that the City, with
full knowledge that the work was progressing in violation of the bylaw and that the house was being occupied without a permit, dropped
the matter because one of its aldermen was involved. Having regard to
the fact that we are here concerned with a statutory duty and that the
plaintiff was clearly a person who should have been in the
contemplation of the City as someone who might be injured by any
breach of that duty, I think this is an appropriate case for the
application of the principle in Anns.55

In arriving at this conclusion, Wilson J. considered unresolved
questions relating to each of the areas of negligence law listed above.
With respect to the liability of public authorities, she found that the
decision at issue here was an operational one and so imposing a duty in
relation to it would not compromise the municipality’s discretion to
make policy decisions.56 Further, though the duty was a positive one,
given that it was a duty that the municipality had elected to impose on
the building inspector, it made no sense to draw a distinction between
nonfeasance and misfeasance.57 Finally, she concluded that the imposition
of liability in these circumstances would not lead to indeterminate
liability.58 On the question of liability for pure economic loss, she
determined that the Court’s prior decision on this issue in Rivtow59 did
not preclude such liability here, given the factual distinctions between
the cases, in particular the lack of contractual overtones in Kamloops.60
53

See, for example, Beth Bilson, “Should City Hall Be Worried? City of Kamloops v.
Nielsen” (1984) 49 Sask. L. Rev. 345; and Bruce Feldthusen, “City of Kamloops v. Nielsen: A
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Modest Clarification of Colonial Tort Law” (1985) 30 McGill
L.J. 539.
54
Kamloops, supra, note 50, at 5.
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Id., at 24.
56
Id., at 12-13.
57
Id., at 24.
58
Id., at 25-26.
59
Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, [1973] S.C.J. No. 126, [1974] S.C.R.
1189 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rivtow”].
60
Kamloops, supra, note 50, at 33-35.
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On the question of when the limitation period should begin to run,
Wilson J. canvassed two conflicting lines of cases and, in contrast to the
House of Lords, embraced the reasonable discoverability rule, that is,
that the limitation period should begin to run not when the damage
occurs but rather at the point when it is reasonably discoverable by the
plaintiff. In adopting the reasonable discoverability rule over the
alternative, Wilson J. emphasized “the injustice of a law which statutebars a claim before the plaintiff is even aware of its existence”.61
Justice Wilson’s statements in Kamloops on the liability of public
authorities and liability for pure economic loss represent incremental
changes in tort law that the Court would build upon to formulate the
more authoritative pronouncements on each issue to be found in later
decisions such as Just62 and Norsk,63 while the adoption of the reasonable
discoverability rule was a more dramatic development that paved the
way for such future innovations as the decision of the Court in M. (K.) v.
M. (H.).64
Incremental expansion was also the order of the day in Crocker,
where the Court was called upon to determine whether the defendant ski
resort “had a positive duty at law to take certain steps to prevent a
visibly intoxicated person from competing in the resort’s dangerous
‘tubing’ competition”.65 Writing for the majority, Wilson J. held that it
did, and that so holding followed logically from the Court’s previous
determination in Menow v. Jordan House66 that a tavern owed a duty in
negligence to an intoxicated patron that “required the defendant to take
certain positive steps to avert potential calamity”.67 In her view it was a
short step from the facts of Menow to those of Crocker:
. . . [W]hen a hotel ejects a drunken patron, it owes a duty of care to the
patron to take certain steps to ensure that the patron arrives home
safely (Jordan House). It would seem a fortiori that when a ski resort
establishes a competition in a highly dangerous sport and runs the
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Id., at 40.
Just v. British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 121, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 (S.C.C.).
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Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] S.C.J. No. 40,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (S.C.C.).
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[1992] S.C.J. No. 85, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (S.C.C.).
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Crocker, supra, note 51, at 1188.
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[1973] S.C.J. No. 80, [1974] S.C.R. 239 (S.C.C.).
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competition for profit, it owes a duty of care towards visibly
intoxicated participants.68

Indeed, Wilson J. concluded that the risk of harm was even greater
in the latter case than in the former.
Finally, in Fletcher,69 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether public insurers owe duties in negligence to their clients. The
plaintiffs suffered serious injuries in a car accident. The driver of the
other car was judged responsible but did not have sufficient insurance to
cover the plaintiffs’ losses so the plaintiffs claimed the shortfall from the
defendant public insurer. The defendant denied the claim because the
plaintiffs had not purchased optional “underinsured motorist coverage”.
The plaintiffs then sued the defendants in negligence alleging that they
had not been properly informed of the full range of coverage available to
them at the time that they purchased their insurance package. The trial
judge found for the plaintiffs but the Court of Appeal allowed the
defendant’s appeal.
Justice Wilson, writing for a unanimous Court, restored the trial
judgment in favour of the plaintiff. In so doing, she endorsed the English
and Canadian cases that had already held insurance agents to have duties
to their clients under the Hedley Byrne principle, stating:
In my view, the sale of automobile insurance is a business in the course
of which information is routinely provided to prospective customers in
the expectation that they will rely on it and who do in fact reasonably
rely on it. It follows, therefore, that the principle in Hedley Byrne
applies and that MPIC will owe a duty of care to its customers if: (i)
such customers rely on the information, (ii) their reliance is reasonable,
and (iii) MPIC knew or ought to have known that they would rely on
the information.70

Of private insurers, she said the following:
In my view, it is entirely appropriate to hold private insurance agents
and brokers to a stringent duty to provide both information and advice
to their customers. They are, after all, licensed professionals who
specialize in helping clients with risk assessment and in tailoring
insurance policies to fit the particular needs of their customers. Their
service is highly personalized, concentrating on the specific
circumstances of each client. Subtle differences in the forms of
68
69
70

Id., at 1198.
Supra, note 52.
Fletcher, id., at 212.
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coverage available are frequently difficult for the average person to
understand. Agents and brokers are trained to understand these
differences and to provide individualized insurance advice. It is both
reasonable and appropriate to impose upon them a duty not only to
convey information but also to provide counsel and advice.71

Turning her mind to the question of the scope of the duties owed by
public insurers, she concluded that circumstances dictate that they not be
quite so onerous. Nevertheless, she found that they did owe duties to
inform clients of the available range of insurance and that the defendant
had failed to meet that duty on the facts of the case.72
Thus we can see from the foregoing that Justice Wilson’s tort
decisions swing from the pole of bold expansion on the one hand to that
of a decisive halting of tort incursion into other areas of the law on the
other, with many stops in between for varying degrees of incremental
tort reform. Clearly, giving in to the temptation to focus on her most
dramatic tort innovation and attempting to ascribe to her an overarching
tort philosophy on that basis would be a mistake.
Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson has said of Justice Wilson’s
judicial work more broadly:
It is of course fairly easy to track the way in which Bertha Wilson
redrew boundaries or incorporated new ideas into existing methods of
analysis. But the less obvious and more difficult exercise, yet one that
is equally important, is to understand why she stopped at any given
point and why in some instances she chose not to realign particular
frontiers.73

Given the subtleties of many of her tort decisions, this seems precisely the
sort of exercise that is required to come to grips with the values that
underpin them and what, if any, tort philosophy they add up to.

V. COMMON THEMES AND UNDERLYING VALUES
Although an overarching tort philosophy is not immediately
apparent in Justice Wilson’s judgments, a careful analysis of her tort
decisions does reveal a series of recurring themes and underlying values
that unite them. I have grouped these themes and values loosely under
71

Id., at 217.
Id., at 217-18.
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the overlapping labels of precedent, principle and pragmatism.74 Below I
will discuss what these labels are intended to denote and which aspects
of Wilson J.’s tort decisions I associate with each.
1. Precedent
I am using the term “precedent” here as an alliterative shorthand to
refer not just to Justice Wilson’s adherence to the doctrine of precedent,
but to the respect that she accorded to the whole constellation of
constraints within which appellate judges operate. Among these,
alongside the doctrine of precedent, I would highlight the emphasis she
placed on showing deference to the findings of fact of trial judges and
also deference to the legislature when she judged it a more appropriate
vehicle for legal reform.
Justice Wilson accorded respect to these constraints not simply as a
matter of form but because she believed that they served an important
function. On this topic, Justice Dickson has said: “[I]t has long seemed
to me that one can only begin to appreciate [Bertha Wilson’s]
contribution fully if one recognizes that underlying her work is a
sophisticated vision both of the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in
our constitutional democracy and of the implications of that role for the
constraints within which a judge must operate.”75 Just as she did not
hesitate to rein in other branches of government when she judged them
to have exceeded their authority in, for example, violating Charter rights,
she reined herself in by respecting the limits of her own judicial role as
she conceived it.
Her reputation as a judicial activist notwithstanding, Justice
Wilson’s judgments are replete with references to prior Supreme Court
decisions; she did not depart from past authority lightly. For example, in
Kamloops she raised questions about the Court’s Rivtow decision on
pure economic loss, noting that the House of Lords had recently
expressed a preference for the approach adopted by Laskin J. over that
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In formulating these categories, I have been influenced by Philip Bryden’s articulation of
Justice Wilson’s characteristics as a judge in “The Democratic Intellect: The State in the Work of
Madame Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 65, at 68-71 [hereinafter “‘The Democratic
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adopted by the majority in the case.76 But rather than revisiting it, she
distinguished the facts of Kamloops, leaving any doubts swirling round
Rivtow for another day: “In any event, the majority judgment of this
Court in Rivtow stands until such time as it may be reconsidered by a full
panel of the Court.”77
She also paid careful consideration to the pronouncements of other
influential courts such as the House of Lords, but without being unduly
deferential to them. For example, again in Kamloops, this time on the
issue relating to limitation periods, she fully canvassed the arguments in
favour of the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Pirelli,78 but
ultimately judged the opposing arguments in favour of the reasonable
discoverability rule more persuasive, stating simply: “This Court is in the
happy position of being free to adopt or reject Pirelli. I would reject it.”79
There are a number of instances in Justice Wilson’s tort judgments
in which she emphasized the importance of deferring to the factual
determinations made by trial judges.80 One of the most definitive can be
found in Fletcher:
These authorities, in my view, make crystal clear the test for
determining when it is appropriate for an appellate court to depart from
a trial judge’s findings of fact: appellate courts should only interfere
where the trial judge has made a “palpable and overriding error which
affected his assessment of the facts.” The very structure of our judicial
system requires this deference to the trier of fact. Substantial resources
are allocated to the process of adducing evidence at first instance and
we entrust the crucial task of sorting through and weighing that
evidence to the person best placed to accomplish it. As this Court and
the House of Lords have repeatedly emphasized, it is the trial judge
who is in the best position to assess the credibility of testimony. An
appellate court should not depart from the trial judge’s conclusions
concerning the evidence “merely on the result of their own comparisons
and criticisms of the witnesses”.81
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Kamloops, supra, note 50, at 32. Rivtow, supra, note 59.
Id., at 33.
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Finally, a clear expression of Justice Wilson’s deference to the
legislature can be found in her majority decision in Tock v. St. John’s
Metropolitan Area Board,82 a case that raised the question of whether a
municipality could rely upon the defence of statutory authority in a
nuisance case. Although she concluded that, on the facts of the case, the
defence was not available to the defendant municipality, she was not
willing to reformulate it along the lines urged by her colleague LaForest
J. in his concurring judgment:
I do not, however, share La Forest J.’s view that this Court should, or
indeed can, on this appeal virtually abolish the defence of statutory
authority for policy reasons and treat municipalities exercising
statutory authority in the same way as private individuals. Such a
major departure from the current state of the law would, it seems to
me, require the intervention of the legislature.83

2. Principle
I am using the term “principle” here in reference to form and to
substance. At the level of form, considerable overlap with the foregoing
will immediately be apparent. For when we speak of “principled
decision-making”, generally we are referring, at least in part, to making
decisions consistent with precedent. In Ronald Dworkin’s liberal
philosophy, this is “law as integrity”:
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding a common-law case . . . to think
of himself as an author in the chain of common law. He knows that
other judges have decided cases that, although not exactly like this
case, deal with related problems; he must think of their decisions as
part of a long story he must interpret and then continue, according to
his own judgment of how to make the developing story as good as it
can be. (Of course the best story for him means best from the
standpoint of political morality, not aesthetics.) . . . The judge’s
decision — his post-interpretive conclusions — must be drawn from an
interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before, so far as
that is possible. 84
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In a number of the cases discussed above in which Justice Wilson
incrementally expanded tort law, her decision-making process can be
characterized as comporting with Dworkin’s description of law as
integrity. For example, in Crocker, to arrive at the conclusion that the
defendant ski resort did owe a positive duty to the plaintiff, she had to
address prior cases that differentiated between nonfeasance and
misfeasance: “The early common law was reluctant to recognize
affirmative duties to act. Limited exceptions were carved out where the
parties were in a special relationship (e.g. parent and child) or where the
defendant had a statutory or contractual obligation to intervene.”85 She
noted the increasing willingness of Canadian courts to expand the
categories of special relationship that constitute exceptions.86 But rather
than simply carving out another exception, she sought to rationalize the
established exceptions and to link the facts of Crocker to them by
identifying the principle that unites them:
. . . The common thread running through these cases is that one is
under a duty not to place another person in a position where it is
foreseeable that that person could suffer injury. The plaintiff’s inability
to handle the situation in which he or she has been placed — either
through youth, intoxication or other incapacity — is an element in
determining how foreseeable the injury is.87

Returning to Dworkin’s explanation of law as integrity, remember
that the goal of this decision-making process is to create “the best story”,
that is, the “best from the standpoint of political morality”.88 This is
where substance comes into it. Best from the standpoint of political
morality will be the decision that best comports with liberal principles
such as autonomy, equality, and fairness.
These are values that Justice Wilson embraced. The complication is
that though these values are sometimes complementary, at other times
they are in tension with one another. In negotiating such tensions, Justice
Wilson espoused a complex, nuanced liberalism. A closer look at the
vision of autonomy that emerges from her tort decisions is illustrative
here.

85
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In such decisions as Dominion Chain,89 Justice Wilson evidenced a
very traditional liberal notion of autonomy. She conceived of the
contracting parties in that case as equals who had arrived at a consensual
agreement. Thus, in her view, respecting their autonomy required giving
effect to that consensual agreement by keeping potentially conflicting
tort duties out of the equation. This determination in this context is very
much in line with a number of her corporate law decisions which
Maureen Maloney has criticized as bordering on libertarian.90
But this starkly individualist vision of autonomy is tempered in other
judgments. For example, in Crocker, the defendant ski resort and the
plaintiff were both private actors in the marketplace as well, and, in
arguing that there ought not to be a positive duty here, or that, in the
alternative, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk ought to apply,
the defendant sought to establish a consensual relationship between
equals, the terms of which (as embodied in the waiver form the plaintiff
had signed) ought to be given effect. Justice Wilson did not see the
relationship that way:
. . . The fact that Crocker was an irresponsible individual and was
voluntarily intoxicated during the tubing competition is the very reason
why Sundance was legally obliged to take all reasonable steps to
prevent Crocker from competing. While it may be acceptable for a ski
resort to allow or encourage sober able-bodied individuals to
participate in dangerous recreational activities, it is not acceptable for
the resort to open its dangerous competitions to persons who are
obviously incapacitated. This is, however, what Sundance did when it
allowed Crocker to compete. I conclude, therefore, that it failed to meet
its standard of care in the circumstances.91

Again in Janiak, where the duty of the plaintiff to mitigate was at
issue, capacity to exercise autonomy was at the heart of the matter for
Justice Wilson:
It seems to me that the line must be drawn between those plaintiffs
who are capable of making a rational decision regarding their own care
and those who, due to some pre-existing psychological condition, are
not capable of making such a decision. … Accordingly, nonpathological but distinctive subjective attributes of the plaintiff’s
89
[1970] O.J. No. 2104, 12 O.R. (3d) 201, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1978]
S.C.J. No. 61, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1346 (S.C.C.).
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personality and mental composition are ignored in favour of an
objective assessment of the reasonableness of his choice. So long as he
is capable of choice the assumption of tort damages theory must be that
he himself assumes the cost of any unreasonable decision. … On the
other hand, if due to some pre-existing psychological condition he is
incapable of making a choice at all, then he should be treated as falling
within the thin skull category and should not be made to bear the cost
once it is established that he has been wrongfully injured.92

If the plaintiff has the capacity to exercise autonomy, that capacity
will be given effect, sometimes to the plaintiff’s detriment. If not,
however, the plaintiff is to be accorded some protection by tort law, here
under the auspices of the thin skull rule.
That Justice Wilson’s vision of autonomy extended beyond a
narrow, individualistic one is particularly apparent when we look at
decisions involving public authorities as defendants. In Kamloops, for
example, we see that she did not hesitate to impose positive duties on
municipalities and municipal employees who have regulatory responsibilities that citizens rely upon them to discharge. Indeed, in other
decisions such as Crocker, we see Wilson J., ever attentive to context,
similarly attaching responsibilities dictated by other social roles, for
example, positive duties imposed on the defendant who is seeking to
profit from his or her engagement with the plaintiff in a commercial host
scenario.
Danielle Pinard has written of Justice Wilson’s “preoccupation with
a contextual notion of liberty” which is “alive and well only if the state
not only respects it in a passive way, but protects and promotes it as well
in a positive way”.93 Wilson’s imposition of positive duties in tort can be
characterized as a means of protecting and promoting the liberty of
vulnerable parties in unequal relationships.
3. Pragmatism
I am not using the term “pragmatism” here to denote the particular
school of legal theory that goes by that label, but simply in the ordinary
sense of the word. Again and again in her tort judgments, we see Justice
Wilson weighing the practical consequences of opting for one legal
92
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solution over another, for the particular parties before her, but also for
others who will thereafter be affected by shifts in the law.
For example, one of the concerns animating her dissent in Dominion
Chain was the importance of certainty in commercial relationships. She
sought to resolve that case in a way that would allow contracting parties
the stability of knowing that their relationship would be governed by the
contractual terms that they had agreed to and that those terms would not
be rewritten by the intervention of tort law. Similarly, in Tock, she
expressed concern about the effect that a shift in the law proposed by La
Forest J. in his concurring judgment would have on the capacity of
public bodies and citizens to sort out their legal rights and
responsibilities:
. . . I do not favour replacing the existing law in this area with a general
test of whether it is reasonable or unreasonable in the circumstances of
the case to award compensation. This test may, because of the high
degree of judicial subjectivity involved in its application, make life
easier for the judges but, in my respectful view, it will do nothing to
assist public bodies to make a realistic assessment of their exposure in
carrying out their statutory mandate. Nor will it provide much guidance
to litigants in deciding whether or not to sue. It is altogether too
uncertain.94

In Kamloops, on the issue relating to limitation periods, in opting for
the reasonable discoverability rule over the alternative adopted by the
House of Lords in Pirelli, Wilson J. was in part influenced by the
practical difficulties she perceived in applying the latter:
There are obvious problems in applying Pirelli. To what extent does
physical damage have to have manifested itself? Is a hair-line crack
enough or does there have to be a more substantial manifestation? And
what of an owner who discovers that his building is constructed of
materials which will cause it to collapse in five years time? According
to Pirelli he has no cause of action until it starts to crumble.95

And in Fletcher, in outlining the scope of the duty owed to clients by
public insurers as opposed to private ones, Wilson J. was attentive to
concrete differences in the set-up of their respective operations and to
the distinct consumer expectations those differences generated:
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By the same token, however, there are a number of reasons why the
public insurer’s duty is less onerous than that of the private agent or
broker. The institutional setting in which the public insurance is sold
affords considerably less scope for privacy and individualized attention
than that provided by a private agency. As the trial judge noted, an
MPIC employee may serve as many as 60 people a day. Further, the
employees who serve the customers do not hold themselves out as
specialists in risk assessment and insurance advice. The service they
provide is more sales and clerical than that provided by an insurance
agent.96

Finally, in Frame,97 in declining to extend the torts of conspiracy and
intentional infliction of mental suffering into the family law context,
Wilson J. considered how such tort actions might be employed in the
middle of the emotionally fraught context of family breakdown, and of
how adding such tort actions into the mix would affect children, the most
vulnerable parties in the situation who would have no voice in a private
tort action between their parents.

VI. CONCLUSION: JUSTICE WILSON’S TORT PHILOSOPHY
Having outlined the themes and values that I perceive to be threaded
through Justice Wilson’s tort decisions, I want to conclude by circling
back around to the question of what, if any, distinct tort philosophy they
reveal. For these themes and values are not unique to Justice Wilson’s
tort decisions, but are evident in her judgments in other areas as well.
In her judgment in Frame, Wilson J. made reference to an ongoing
debate about the theoretical basis for tort law which stretches back to the
19th century. She cited the following passage from Cases and Materials
on the Law of Torts by Solomon et al. by way of illustration:
Initially, the search for a theoretical basis for tort law centred on the
issue of whether there was a general principle of tortious liability. Sir
John Salmond argued that tort law was merely a patchwork of distinct
causes of action, each protecting different interests and each based on
separate principles of liability [see Salmond, The Law of Torts (6th ed.,
1924) at pp. 9-10]. Essentially the law of torts was a finite set of
independent rules, and the courts were not free to recognize new heads
of liability. In contrast, writers such as Pollock contended that the law
of torts was based upon the single unifying principle that all harms
96
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were tortious unless they could be justified [see Pollock, The Law of
Torts (13th ed., 1929) at p. 21]. The courts were thus free to recognize
new torts. Glanville Williams suggested a compromise between the
two viewpoints. He argued that tort law historically exhibited no
comprehensive theory, but that the existing categories of liability were
sufficiently flexible to enable tort law to grow and adapt.98

Justice Wilson allowed that it “would perhaps be interesting for the
Court to join in this debate”, but for purposes of arriving at a decision on
the facts before her, she endorsed Glanville Williams’ compromise,
pronouncing it a “pragmatic resolution” which “correctly characterizes
the task before the Court when confronted with a heretofore
unprecedented basis for liability”. 99 She concluded:
Thus, whatever one considers the theoretical foundation of liability to
be, it is not enough for the appellant simply to invoke a general
principle of freedom from harm. Rather, he must show why “existing
principles of liability may properly be extended”, that is, he must
identify the nature of the right he invokes and justify its protection.100

In the discussion of principle above, I linked Justice Wilson to the
liberal legal philosophy espoused by Ronald Dworkin, but she cannot be
neatly slotted there when considering her tort decisions as a whole. The
blending of principle and pragmatism in her decisions of which the
above statement is emblematic precludes that. Note, for example, that
Dworkin has categorically stated that Hercules, the super-human judge
he created to personify law as integrity, rejects the pragmatism that
would have him weighing policy alongside principle.101
But considering Justice Wilson’s nuanced, contextualized liberalism,
which blends principle with pragmatism, and infuses autonomy with
equality, I think it would be fair to link her tort jurisprudence with tort
theorists that I have described elsewhere as cautious optimists about the
progressive potential of tort law.102
These cautious optimists insist not only that tort can serve an
educative or symbolic function which fosters equality, but that it must do
so. Accordingly, they find promise in some of the underlying principles
98
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of tort law and in two trends in modern tort law — shifting conceptions
of autonomy, and the “etherialization” of tort law.103
Ken Cooper-Stephenson stresses that “tort law locates itself in, and
is throughout influenced by, a socio-legal context which includes
important norms of substantive equality”.104 He suggests not only that
tort law can and should integrate concepts of substantive equality that
have developed in human rights law, but that it already has.105 He asserts
that tort law frequently “serves to redistribute collective wealth for the
benefit of the underprivileged and disadvantaged at the expense of the
privileged and the advantaged” through the way threshold questions of
duty and tort obligation are constructed and answered.106 This is evident
in determinations of what counts as a loss for purposes of tort law, in the
choice of fault requirements for different relationships and, finally, in the
types of relationships which tort law recognizes as significant in the
imposition of duties.107 He concedes that at one time tort law concerned
itself primarily with protecting the advantaged, by virtue of their status
as property owners, but asserts that tort law’s distributive sympathies
have changed gradually to address the interests of the underprivileged
and powerless.108 He concludes: “In short, a tort remedy is corrective at
its core but is set in a distributive egalitarian context which drives its
content.”109
Martin Kotler tracks the development of a shift away from the
primacy of property concerns in American tort law which supports
Cooper-Stephenson’s point. Kotler asserts that American tort law is
currently “between paradigms”, but that autonomy has been and remains
103
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its primary goal. The change that has occurred has been in the way that
autonomy is conceived: “Although at one time protection of autonomy
was understood primarily in terms of protection of private property
rights, now the societal and legal perception of autonomy focuses on the
protection of one’s bodily integrity.”110
In support of his thesis, Kotler points to the fact that preventative
remedies are now available to protect individuals from bodily invasion
in advance, for example, in the context of domestic violence, whereas
before-the-fact remedies are no longer as readily available to protect
private property from damage.111 Putting bodily integrity at the core of
autonomy in place of property interests necessarily compels tort law in a
more egalitarian direction. At the very least, it affords tort protection to a
broader range of people.
Nancy Levit describes a process of the progressive “etherealization”
of tort law which, I would contend, marks a further evolution in
conceptions of autonomy beyond bodily integrity to emotional integrity.
She points to the recent trend toward successful claims for intangible and
emotional injuries, claims to which courts have not traditionally been
receptive because of social and legal devaluation of the injuries which
give rise to them.112
A number of Justice Wilson’s judgments can be characterized as
having furthered the shift in conceptions of autonomy that underpin tort
doctrine and also the etherealization of tort law. In her tort judgments,
she conceptualizes autonomy in a contextualized way that is attuned to
the varying capacities of individuals and to the inequalities that may be
present in the relationships and in the broader social contexts within
which those individuals are embedded. Further, her conception of the
legal interests which tort law ought to protect expands well beyond
interests in property and in bodily integrity to encompass the dignitary
harms of which the plaintiff in Bhadauria113 complained. Certainly an
interest in equality animates Justice Wilson’s tort decisions, whether she
is opting to expand tort liability or to hold the line. To expand tort law
by creating a tort of discrimination in Bhadauria served the goal of
equality, whereas to expand the tort of conspiracy into the family law
110
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context in Frame114 would have been to compromise equality by
worsening the situation of the most vulnerable parties in the equation,
the children.
While few would suggest that tort law can play a pivotal role in
correcting injustice and inequality in society, it does constitute one of the
tools available in that larger quest. Cooper-Stephenson states:
Although tort law is unlikely to be the primary mechanism for the
development of an appropriate balance between the advantaged and
disadvantaged in Canadian society — of a more generalized just
distribution of rights, entitlements and rewards — tort law nevertheless
forms part of a structure of norms that can be moulded and cultivated
in a principled way to further implement substantive justice.115

Throughout her career, Justice Wilson demonstrated a commitment
to implementing substantive justice. In her role as a judge, tort law was
just one of the tools available to her by which to pursue that
commitment. In instances when she found it to be poorly suited to the
task, she turned to other means. But when she judged it an appropriate
and effective tool, she did not hesitate to employ it to achieve reform,
whether bold or incremental. In so doing, she produced a body of tort
jurisprudence from which those who maintain a cautious optimism about
the progressive potential of tort law can draw some inspiration.
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